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SIMPLIFYING CHOICE-OF-LAW
INTEREST ANALYSIS
LUKE MEIER*
Modern choice-of-law doctrine invites judges to consider the interests that
states have in applying their law to a dispute. But modern choice-of-law
doctrine has never provided judges with a rubric by which to conduct this
interest analysis. This trend continues in the proposed draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Conflicts of Law.
This Article attempts to fill that void by proposing an extremely simple
rubric by which judges can determine whether a state has an interest in
applying its law to a horizontal choice-of-law dispute. In actuality, the rubric
proposed herein reaches the results that most courts have reached without
the rubric. The rubric, however, will make it much easier to reach that result.
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I. Introduction
In the mid-twentieth century, American horizontal choice of law
underwent a dramatic transformation.1 Prior to this transformation, choice-oflaw issues were usually resolved according to a relatively simple “territorial”
approach.2 Under this approach, a court applied the law of the state where an
important factual event between the parties had occurred. 3 The relevant
factual event was usually based upon the points at which the plaintiff’s legal
rights became “vested” against the defendant.4 Thus, for instance, in a torts
1. See generally Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The
New Jersey Experience, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 528–29 (2005) (describing the transformation
in choice of law).
2. See LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 166–
67 (2d ed. 2018) (describing the territorial approach and how it had a “stranglehold on
United States courts in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century”).
3. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1191, 1195 (1987) (explaining that under the traditional approach “the law governing a
given legal interaction was almost always the law of the place in which certain discrete,
specified events in that interaction took place”).
4. See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of
the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2010) (equating the vested rights
approach with the traditional territorial approach of the First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness
over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 658 n.32 (1987) (“The vested rights theorists believed
instead that, at some specified moment in some specified geographic location (the time and
place of the occurrence of some specified event), the rights giving rise to a cause of action
are created or ‘vested.’”). Other scholars have noted that the territorial approach can be
separated from Professor Joseph Beale’s “vested rights” synthesis of it. See CLYDE
SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 59 (2010) (“It is essential to distinguish the
general idea of lex loci as simply one practical approach to the choice-of-problem, from
Beale’s elaborate systematization of it, based on the concept of ‘vested rights.’”). Notably,
Professor Beale drafted the first publication of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Law.
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dispute, the relevant factual event would be the moment in which the plaintiff
was injured, because it was only after an injury occurred that the plaintiff had
legal recourse against the tortfeasor defendant.5 To resolve a choice-of-law
dispute, then, the court simply applied the law of the state where the injury
had occurred. This traditional approach was captured by the original
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (“First Restatement”). 6
This all changed in the middle of the twentieth century. Gradually, courts
and commentators came to the view that choice-of-law analysis must include
consideration of the interests that states have (or do not have) in applying
their law to a horizontal choice-of-law dispute.7 This view is most closely
associated with academic Brainerd Currie.8 In the famous case of Babcock v.

John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 1147,
1167 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420162.
5. See Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy in Non-Contractual Obligations: Rome II and Its
Impacts on Choice of Law, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 876 (2009) (“[T]he 1934
Restatement enshrined the lex loci doctrine, escalating “the place of wrong” to the level of a
general rule in determining the applicable law for torts.”); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of
Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 724–25 (2009) (“The
First Restatement defines the place of wrong as ‘the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.’ Usually this is the location where the
plaintiff was injured, since liability does not arise without injury. Thus, under the First
Restatement, if the injury occurs in State A, the judge should apply the law of State A.”).
6. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law Apply
Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301, 314–15 (2014) (describing generally the territorial approach of
the First Restatement). But see Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral
Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1367, 1374–75 (2004) (explaining that the First Restatement rules did not always produce
clear-cut results due to inconsistent application of the territoriality principle).
7. See Gary J. Simson, An Essay on Illusion and Reality in the Conflict of Laws, 70
MERCER L. REV. 819, 822 (2019) (“Every one of the many state supreme courts that has
joined the revolution in choice-of-law practice that began with Babcock [v. Jackson] has
included governmental interest analysis as a fundamental ingredient of its choice-of-law
approach.”); Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, 37 WILLAMETTE. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) (“[M]ost if not all other modern American
choice-of-law approaches have adopted two of the basic premises of [Professor Brainerd
Currie’s] analysis: (a) the notion that states have an ‘interest’ in the outcome of multistate
private-law disputes, and (b) the notion that these ‘interests’ must be taken into account,
albeit together with other factors, in resolving these conflicts.”).
8. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 949, 953 (1994) (“Beale's theories came under almost immediate attack from the
followers of the emerging legal realist movement, but it was not until Brainerd Currie
developed his brand of governmental interest analysis that Beale's ‘vested rights’ theory had
a serious choice of law competitor.”).
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Jackson,9 Judge Stanley Fuld signaled judicial acceptance of the state-interest
approach.10
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Second Restatement”)
embraced the idea that resolving a choice-of-law dispute required
consideration of the interests that states do (or do not) have in applying their
law to the litigation in which the choice-of-law dispute arose.11 The Second
Restatement, however, offered judges little guidance for identifying whether
states have an interest.12 Consequently, judges have struggled to perform the
interest analysis that modern choice-of-law doctrine requires.13
9. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); see also Gary J. Simson, Choice of Law After the
Currie Revolution: What Role for the Needs of the Interstate and International Systems?, 63
MERCER L. REV. 715, 718 (2012) (“Broadly speaking, the history of choice of law in the
courts of the United States can be divided into two eras: before Babcock v. Jackson and
after.”).
10. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 283 (“Justice, fairness, and ‘the best practical result’ may
best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of
its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation.” (citation omitted)).
11. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 424 (2000) (“Subsections 6(2)(b) and (c) [of the
Second Restatement] clearly contemplate the court’s performing some sort of interest
analysis.”).
12. In addition to providing judges very little guidance as to how to determine whether a
state had an interest, the Second Restatement was ambiguous with regard to how a stateinterest analysis should factor into the ultimate choice of law result. Thus, although a stateinterest analysis was clearly contemplated by the Second Restatement, the Second
Restatement approach also allowed for other considerations. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The
Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 329, 360–61 (1997) (“[S]ection 6 of the second Restatement incorporates
interest analysis as part of the Restatement’s most significant relationship test. But only as a
part. The other principles in section 6 delve into matters that have nothing to do with interest
analysis.”). In this regard, the Second Restatement has been criticized as an ambiguous
“approach” rather than a restatement of workable “rules.” See Steven Bradford, Conflict of
Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Territorial Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909,
910–11 (1991) (“The Second Restatement fails miserably at reducing the ambiguity and
manipulation inherent in the modern, policy-based approaches. Its compromise approach can
be used to justify virtually any choice of law.”). The drafters of the Second Restatement
were aware of this ambiguity, but they believed that the proper role for a Restatement was to
descriptively restate the law as it existed, even if that law was in transition and thus
somewhat amorphous. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, COUNCIL DRAFT
NO. 4, Reporter’s Memorandum at xviii (AM. LAW INST. 2020) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)] (on file with author) (“[I]t . . . was not that Willis Reese, [the Second
Restatement’s] Reporter, thought that the opaque and labor-intensive process [the Second
Restatement] prescribed was an ideal choice-of-law system. It was rather that he did not
believe choice of law in torts was ready for restatement in the form of rules.”). The Third
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The Third Restatement—which is still in draft form—attempts to simplify
modern choice of law.14 This is definitely a step in the right direction.
Unfortunately, however, the Third Restatement does not go far enough in
advancing its goals of “identify[ing] convergent practices and captur[ing]
them in simple rules.”15 In the following Part, I identify a simple rubric that
explains a high percentage of choice-of-law cases. Going forward, courts
would be well-served to apply this simplified approach.16
II. A Rubric for Identifying State Interests
Courts should follow this two-step rubric (“Rubric”) for determining
which (if any) states have an interest in applying their law to a choice-of-law
dispute:

Restatement seems devoted to restating American choice of law in a series of rules rather
than an approach; the state-interest analysis appears to drive the rules that the Third
Restatement identifies. See Joseph William Singer, Choice of Law Rules, 50 CUMB. L. REV.
347, 347 (2020) (“The new rules being offered by the Third Restatement are far better than
those of the prior Restatements. They are better because they . . . reflect careful use of
interest analysis and attention to party rights . . . .”).
13. See Paul E. McGreal, Conflict of Laws, 47 SMU L. REV. 865, 865 (1994) (“Again,
courts struggled to merely identify the proper choice of law rules in the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws.”). The struggle of judges to apply interest analysis comes as academics
continue to hotly debate it. See Yunsieg P. Kim, Conflict of Laws for the Age of Cybertorts:
A Game-Theoretic Study of Corporate Profiteering from Choice of Law Loopholes and
Interstate Torts, 46 BYU L. REV. 329, 348 (2021) (“The debate over interest analysis
remains especially memorable, both for its longevity and the acrimonious tone taken by
some interlocutors, rare even for legal academia.”).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, at 2 (“These rules [in the Third
Restatement] capture majority practice while offering certainty and predictability to parties
and simplicity and ease of application to courts.”).
15. See generally id. at xix.
16. This Article, then, has both a descriptive and normative perspective. The basic
rubric proposed in this Article would simplify choice of law for judges, lawyers, and
litigants. This simplification would greatly benefit judges and would benefit litigants as a
class, as less time and money would be spent litigating choice-of-law issues. The Third
Restatement is not as free to advance a normative perspective on what choice of law should
look like. See, e.g., id. at xi (asserting that a principal element of a Restatement is to
“ascertain the nature of the majority rule”). Nevertheless, the rules I am normatively arguing
for are pretty accurate in describing the results in a large percentage of choice-of-law cases.
Thus, the rubric I am proposing will not be a dramatic alteration in caselaw results, but
rather a simplified route by which to achieve these results.
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1. If a domicile of a state is asking for his home-state law to apply,
that state has an interest.
2. Identify the state whose law would apply under the approach
outlined in the First Restatement.17 If that state’s law is preferred
by the plaintiff18 in the current litigation, that state has an interest.
This Rubric incorporates the two primary ways in which courts have
traditionally identified state interests: a domicile-based approach and a
contacts-based approach.19 Step One considers the litigants’ domicile (and the
litigants’ requested state law). Step Two employs a contacts-based approach.
Tracing back to Judge Fuld’s first judicial foray into state-interest analysis in
Babcock, these two inquiries20 have accounted for most judicial efforts to
identify state interests in a choice-of-law dispute.21
This Rubric will not necessarily resolve all choice-of-law disputes. Under
Step One, one or more states might have an interest, or no state might have an
interest. Moreover, under Step Two, an additional state might have an interest
(states can have an interest under both Step One and Step Two). Employing
the terminology first coined by Professor Currie, the results of applying the
Rubric can create either a “true conflict,” a “false conflict,” or an
“unprovided-for” case.22 In a true conflict, more than one state has an interest.
In a false conflict, one (and only one) state has an interest. In an unprovidedfor case, no state has an interest.
17. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
18. By “plaintiff” here, I do not necessarily mean the party who filed suit (although that
will usually be the case). Rather, “plaintiff” here means the party who is seeking relief from
a court. The party who is content with the status quo is not the “plaintiff,” regardless of
which party initiates the litigation. Thus, for instance, consider a party who anticipates a
civil suit against it but (for strategic reasons) initiates the litigation by filing suit for a
declaratory judgment. This party is not a “plaintiff” for purposes of the choice-of-law
Rubric. Rather, the party who will be asking the court to award it civil relief (damages or an
injunction) is the “plaintiff.”
19. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 271–72 (2016) (explaining that both
territorial and domicile-based factors are important to modern choice-of-law approaches that
require consideration of a state’s interest).
20. The Third Restatement uses the terms “territorial connecting factors” and “personal
connecting factors.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, at xviii–xix (“One way of
describing the choice-of-law revolution is as embodying the realization that other connecting
factors matter too—other territorial factors, like the place of conduct, but also personal
connecting factors like the parties’ domicile.”).
21. See id. at xviii.
22. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Absolute Conflicts of Law, 91 IND. L.J. 719, 728 (2016)
(describing Currie’s creation of the terminology).
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A false conflict is easily resolved: Apply the law of the only state that has
an interest in applying its law to this dispute.23 True conflicts and unprovidedfor cases, however, have proven more difficult to resolve. A few states
purport to weigh interests.24 For example, California purports to weigh the
impairment on each state’s interest if its law is not applied. 25 Yet, this
approach only works for true conflicts; in an unprovided-for case, there is no
interest to weigh or impairment to compare. Professor Currie, however,
argued that true conflicts and unprovided-for cases would require a
tiebreaker.26 Many jurisdictions have employed such a tiebreaker (either
explicitly or implicitly), usually defaulting to either forum law (Currie’s
preference) or to the law that would be selected under the First Restatement’s
traditional approach.27
Thus, a jurisdiction employing the two-step Rubric will still need to
determine what to do when the Rubric indicates that multiple states (or no
states) have an interest.28 Although this question is beyond the general scope
of this Article, the conclusion in Part V advocates for a tiebreaker that
defaults to the law that would be selected under the traditional territorial23. See Andrew D. Bradt, Resolving Intrastate Conflicts of Laws: The Example of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 603, 615 (2015) (“In the language of interest
analysis, that [circumstance] is a ‘false conflict,’ and represents an easy case.”).
24. See LITTLE, supra note 2, at 338 (“[O]ther jurisdictions [besides New Jersey] have
experimented with a balancing approach for resolving true conflicts . . . .”).
25. See Patrick J. Borchers, An Essay on Predictability in Choice-of-Law Doctrine and
Implications for a Third Conflicts Restatement, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 495, 496 (2016)
(“Instead, California adopted the ‘comparative impairment’ solution—that is, applying the
law of the state whose interests would be most impaired if it were not applied—for true
conflicts.”).
26. See Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1999, 2017 (“As gleaned from Currie’s writings (and, as we shall see, from
certain Supreme Court cases), the general rule is that the interested forum should apply its
own law.”); Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has
Harford Fire Extinguished Considerations of Comity?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 221, 232–
33 (1994) (explaining Currie’s forum-law tiebreaker in true and unprovided-for cases).
27. See Michael S. Green, The Return of the Unprovided-For Case, 51 GA. L. REV. 763,
776–77 (2017) (listing Kentucky and Michigan as two states that seem to default to forum
law for true conflicts).
28. Also, of course, a court employing the Rubric would have to determine which
state’s law would be applied under the First Restatement. Usually, this will be a
straightforward exercise (the First Restatement is characterized by relatively simple, easy-toapply rules), but in some instances determining the First Restatement jurisdiction might be
more difficult. See, e.g., William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice
in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1206 (1997).
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based approach. There are a number of reasons favoring a tiebreaker (as
opposed to a weighing or balancing approach). Amongst the tie-breaking
candidates, using the law selected by the First Restatement makes the most
sense.
Once a jurisdiction decides on a tie-breaking method, however, most
choice-of-law disputes could be very easily resolved using the Rubric. This
simplicity would be extremely valuable. As Dean William Prosser said
decades ago, choice-of-law doctrine is a “dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The
ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.”29
The Rubric would have a disentangling effect, making choice of law much
less dismal.
Moreover, the Rubric generates outcomes that are largely consistent with
how courts decide choice-of-law cases. It just gets to those outcomes with
fewer quagmires and less “incomprehensible jargon.”30 Part IV explores
these results below.
III. Explaining the Rubric
Under the Rubric, a state can have an interest pursuant to either a
domicile-based approach or a contacts-based approach.
A. Step One: A Domicile-Based Approach
Under the domicile-based approach, a state might have an interest in
applying its law to a choice-of-law dispute if a party to the litigation is from
that state. (Thus, for instance, Michigan may have an interest under the
domicile-based approach if one of the parties is from Michigan.) In this
scenario, the party will either ask for—or argue against—the application of
his home state’s law.31 Under the Rubric, an interest exists when a party asks
29. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
30. See id.
31. An interest analysis (indeed, all choice-of-law analyses) proceeds from the
assumption that certain states’ laws are being considered. This process of framing the
horizontal choice-of-law dispute is almost always done by the parties: One party will argue
that Michigan law applies, while the other will argue for Ohio law. Once the parties have
framed the choice-of-law dispute, the judge’s task is to pick either Michigan or Ohio law.
When the judge uses an interest analysis to resolve this dispute, the judge’s task is to identify
whether Michigan or Ohio have an interest in having their law apply. Notice that the judge
does not start with this question: “What are all of the states that are interested in applying
their law to this dispute?” Rather, the parties (through argument) will frame the states whose
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for her home state’s law to apply but not when a party argues against
application of her home state’s law.
1. Protect/Reward Theory (Match)
Under the Rubric, if a party asks for her home state’s law to apply, an
interest is created. When there is a match between (1) the domicile of a party
and (2) the law that party prefers, the state is interested because it wants to
apply its law to benefit its domiciliary. This applies to either plaintiffs or
defendants. Thus, if a plaintiff from Iowa asks for Iowa law to apply, Iowa
has an interest in applying its law to reward or protect the Iowa party.
Similarly, if a defendant from Nebraska asks for Nebraska law to apply,
Nebraska has an interest in applying its law to protect the Nebraska party.
Notice, then, that for each party, a domicile-based interest might be created if
there is a match between that party’s domicile and the law that party prefers
in the choice-of-law dispute.
Determining that a state has an interest under the protect/reward (match)
theory is uncontroversial and widely prevalent.32 There are countless
examples of courts using this logic.33
interests must be determined. What this means for an interest analysis under the domicilebased approach, then, is that a court will not start by looking at the domicile of the parties
and then determining whether those states have an interest. Instead, a court will start with the
states whose law the parties have asked the court to apply and then determine whether there
is a domicile from those states. Thus, in the hypothetical above in which the judge must pick
between Michigan or Ohio law, the fact that one of the parties is domiciled in Kansas would
be inconsequential, because neither party is asking for the application of Kansas law. The
critical question is whether either of the parties is domiciled in Michigan or Ohio, because
those are the two states whose law the parties are asking for. In other words, the parties’
framing of the choice-of-law dispute determines the states whose interests the court will
consider in resolving a horizontal choice-of-law dispute. This explains the statement in the
text that a “party will either ask for—or argue against—the application of his home state’s
law.” The only parties whose domiciles matter are the litigants from a state whose law is
being requested in the choice-of-law dispute.
32. See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was Dick? Constitutional Limitations on State
Choice of Law, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 37, 44 (“Under the modern approach to choice of law,
interest analysis, nothing is more significant to the question of which state's law should
apply than the domicile of the parties.”).
33. See, e.g., Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 77 P.3d 439 (Ariz. 2003); Wallis v. Mrs.
Smith’s Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453 (Ark. 1977); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967);
First Nat’l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594
A.2d 38 (Del. 1991); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981);
Airgo, Inc. v. Horizon Cargo Transp., Inc., 670 P.2d 1277 (Haw. 1983); Seubert Excavators,
Inc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 889 P.2d 82 (Idaho 1995); Nelson v. Hix, 522 N.E.2d 1214
(Ill. 1988); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276
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2. Punish Theory (Mismatch)
When a party litigant resists application of his home state’s law, this
destroys the theoretical basis on which an interest is found pursuant to the
protect/reward theory. When a plaintiff from Iowa asks for Iowa law, Iowa’s
interest is based on the notion that it is interested in Iowans getting the benefit
of Iowa law. If the Iowa plaintiff, however, argues against the application of
Iowa law, this same rationale does not work.
Nevertheless, courts have occasionally determined that a state has a
domicile-based interest in applying its law against a home-state litigant. The
most famous application of this reasoning was by Judge Fuld in Neumeier v.
Kuehner.34 In Neumeier, an automobile passenger brought suit in New York
against the driver of the automobile for an accident that occurred in Ontario. 35
The plaintiff (guest-passenger) was a domiciliary of Ontario while the
defendant-driver was a domiciliary of New York.36 The defendant-driver
claimed the protection of the Ontario guest statute.37 The plaintiff resisted
application of Ontario law, instead asking the court to apply New York law
(which did not have a guest statute).38
The Neumeier case was a “mismatch” fact pattern: The Ontario plaintiff
resisted Ontario law, while the New York defendant resisted New York law.
Nevertheless, in concluding that Ontario law applied, Judge Fuld explained
So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570 (Me. 1995); Hartford Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bruchey, 238 A.2d 115 (Md. Ct. App. 1968); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416
(Mass. 1976); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 141 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1966); Smith v. Church Mut.
Ins. Co., 254 So. 3d 57 (Miss. 2018); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, 298 Mont.
438, 995 P.2d 1002; Heinze v. Heinze, 274 N.W.2d 465 (Neb. 2007); Dictor v. Creative
Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 223 P.3d 332 (Nev. 2010); Lessard v. Clarke, 736 A.2d 1226 (N.H.
1999); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (N.J. 1967); Terrazas v. Garland & Loman, Inc., 142
P.3d 374 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); Shaw v. Carolina Coach, 918 N.Y.S.2d 120 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011); Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 914 (N.C. 1991); Mager v. Mager, 197
N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1972); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 267 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 1971);
Brickner v. Gooden, 1974 OK 91, 525 P.2d 632; Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng’g Co., 428
P.2d 898 (Or. 1967); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 222 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1966); Najarian v. Nat’l
Amusements, Inc., 768 A.2d 1253 (R.I. 2001); Boone v. Boone, 546 S.E.2d 191 (S.C. 2001);
Brazones v. Prothe, 489 N.W.2d 900 (S.D. 1992); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53
(Tenn. 1992); Toyota Motor Co. v. Cook, 581 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App. 2019); State ex rel.
S.O. v. H.O., 2005 UT App 393, 122 P.3d 686; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette,
2002 WI 31, 251 Wis. 2d 561, 641 N.W.2d 662.
34. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
35. Id. at 455.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 455–56.
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that Ontario had a domicile-based interest: namely, to apply its pro-defendant
guest statute against an Ontario plaintiff-passenger so as to punish the
“ungrateful guest[].”39 Ontario’s interest was not based on applying its rule to
help a domiciliary, but rather to punish the domiciliary for his behavior.40
In my perspective, Judge Fuld’s use of the punish theory in Neumeier was
ridiculous. Most courts seem to agree: It is very hard to find cases employing
the punish theory against a plaintiff.41 The punish theory is somewhat more
plausible, however, when it is employed against defendants. For instance, in
DeLoach v. Alfred,42 the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that Arizona had
an interest in applying Arizona’s shorter statute of limitations against Arizona
defendants who had caused an accident in Tennessee.43 The intermediate
appellate court had reasoned that Arizona lacked an interest because the
Arizona statute of limitations would work in favor of the California plaintiff
and to the detriment of the Arizona defendant.44 The Arizona Supreme Court,
however, employed the punish theory to explain why Arizona was interested
in applying its law against the Arizona defendant: “Arizona courts have long
recognized that . . . holding tortfeasors accountable . . . advances the
important interest in deterring wrongful conduct. . . . Thus the policy of
deterrence extends to providing a forum for redress against Arizona
defendants for their negligent conduct outside the state.”45
Although the punish theory is more plausible when applied against
defendants (“don’t engage in this behavior, citizens, regardless of where it
happens”), it is still rejected much more frequently than it is used. 46 Thus,
when a defendant resists the application of his home state’s law, courts most
39. Id. at 455.
40. In Neumeier, the plaintiff’s punishment under Ontario’s guest statute was warranted
because of the plaintiff’s temerity in attempting to recover for injuries (his death) from a
person who, after all, was giving him a free ride. See id. at 455–56.
41. There are a few. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679,
687 (N.Y. 1985) (explaining that New Jersey had an interest in applying its pro-defendant
charitable immunity doctrine against plaintiffs from New Jersey because it “further[ed] that
State’s interest in enforcing the decision of its domiciliaries to accept the burdens as well as
the benefits of that State’s [charitable immunity rule]”).
42. 960 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1998).
43. Id. at 629, 632 (“Thus the policy of deterrence extends to providing a forum for
redress against Arizona defendants for their negligent conduct outside the state.”).
44. Id. at 631.
45. Id. at 632.
46. See, e.g., Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494, 496 (Or. 1973) (“However, it is stretching
the imagination more than a trifle to conceive that the Oregon Legislature was concerned
about the rights of all the nonresident married women in the nation whose husbands would
be injured outside of the state of Oregon.”).
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frequently conclude that no interest is created under this “mismatch.” Despite
the punish theory’s decreasing application, there are still a small minority of
cases that have used the theory to conclude that a state has an interest in
applying its law against the home-state defendant.47
Considering the punish theory as it applies to both plaintiffs and
defendants, then, courts have overwhelmingly rejected this basis for
concluding that a state has an interest.48
Moreover, in the few instances in which courts have used the punish
theory, its application has often been inconsistent and illogical. In Neumeier,
Judge Fuld reasoned that Ontario had an interest in applying its law to punish
an Ontario plaintiff.49 In the same case, however, the New York defendant
also resisted application of his home state’s law.50 Despite using the punish
theory to find an Ontario interest, Judge Fuld did not even consider whether
the punish theory could be used to determine that New York had an interest
in applying its law against a New York defendant.51
Courts infrequently use the domicile-based punish theory for finding an
interest.52 When applied, the rationale underlying the theory is suspect.
Moreover, it is difficult to discern why the theory is used in some instances
but rejected in others (sometimes even in the same case). For these reasons, I
have excluded the punish theory as a route by which a court can find an
interest under a domicile-based approach. The goal of the Rubric is to
simplify choice-of-law disputes. The small set of cases employing the punish
theory are an easy sacrifice to make toward the goal of simplification.

47. See, e.g., DeLoach, 960 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1998); Smith v. I-Flow Corp., 753 F. Supp.
2d 744 (D.C. Ill. 2010) (noting “there is little precedence on this issue” of applying the law
for defendant’s domicile against him).
48. See supra notes 41, 46 and accompanying text.
49. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455 (N.Y. 1972).
50. Id.
51. This argument would have been the one that the Arizona Supreme Court used in
DeLoach in finding that Arizona had a deterrence interest in applying its pro-plaintiff rules
against a home-state litigant. As discussed in this Article, the DeLoach argument seems
much more persuasive than the argument that Judge Fuld used in Neumeier to determine that
Ontario had an interest.
52. See supra note 48.
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B. Step Two: A Contacts-Based Approach
Modern choice of law holds that it is important to ascertain the interests
that states have in applying their law to a dispute.53 But modern choice of law
does not completely reject the contacts-based approach of the First
Restatement. Instead, modern choice of law recognizes that territorial
contacts—where events in the dispute happened—can still be important to
resolving a choice-of-law dispute.54 These contacts, however, are not the end
of the analysis (as they were under the First Restatement). Instead, these
contacts are a means to an end: A territorial contact is important because it
might trigger a state interest.55
Here again, judicial acceptance of the notion that territorial contacts might
create an interest can be traced back to Judge Fuld.56 In Babcock v. Jackson,
the tort injury had occurred in Ontario.57 Judge Fuld, however, concluded that
this contact did not create an interest because of the type of Ontario law that
was involved in the specific horizontal choice-of-law dispute before the
court:
It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario’s interest is quite
different from what it would have been had the issue related to the
manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time
of the accident. . . . In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the
law of the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction’s
interest in regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be
almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some
other place.58
Judge Fuld’s observation in Babcock is intuitive, and it has proven to be
extremely influential. A contact may or may not create an interest, depending

53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
54. See Graham C. Lilly & Molly Bishop Shadel, When Privilege Fails: Interstate
Litigation and the Erosion of Privilege Law, 66 ARK. L. REV. 613, 642 (2013) (arguing that a
choice-of-law approach must value both territorial and domicile interests in order to
survive).
55. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963) (“Justice, fairness, and
the ‘best practical result’ may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the
jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties,
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)).
56. Id. at 280, 283.
57. Id. at 280.
58. Id. at 284.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

350

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:337

on the type of law involved in the choice-of-law dispute. But which type of
laws create contact-based interests, and which do not?
In answering this question, courts have frequently distinguished between
“conduct-regulating” rules and “loss-allocating” rules.59 Conduct-regulating
rules are thought to create contact-based state interests, whereas lossallocating rules do not.60
The Third Restatement wholly adopts this framework (at least for torts). 61
Moreover, the Third Restatement goes one step further by attempting to
provide a list classifying laws as either conduct-regulating or lossallocating.62
I certainly applaud this ambitious attempt at clarifying the law. However,
for reasons explained below, I believe the Third Restatement’s attempt to
classify laws as either conduct-regulating or loss-allocating is misguided—
both analytically and practically.
The Rubric incorporates the basic concept that a contact may or may not
create an interest, depending upon the type of law involved. Under the
Rubric, however, it is necessary to ask only one question: Does the state
where the relevant contact occurred have a law favored by the plaintiff in the
current horizontal choice-of-law dispute? If so, an interest is created. (That is,
the law is “conduct-regulating.”) If not, no interest is created. (That is, the
law is “loss-allocating.”)
Another question remains: Which contact(s) count? Under the First
Restatement, one relevant contact was identified. For torts, it was the place of

59. John T. Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choiceof-Law, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 425–26 (2003) (“[A] review of cases across the nation
reveals that courts across the land treat conduct-regulating rules differently than lossallocating rules in the choice-of-law process.”); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, A
Reexamination of the Distinction Between “Loss-Allocating” and “Conduct-Regulating
Rules,” 60 LA. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2000) (“The basic rule is, as to laws that are conductregulating, to apply the law of the place of conduct, and, as to laws that are loss-allocating
and the parties are from the same state, to apply the law of the common domicile.”).
60. See Cross, supra note 59, at 431 (“[The state where the tort occurred] clearly has an
‘interest’ in applying its conduct-regulating rules to all conduct that occurs within its
borders.”); see also id. at 433 n.28 (noting that, where only one party is from a state, that
state will have an interest in applying its loss-allocating rules “only if the law benefits its
resident, or in the less-common case where the law hurts its resident and the state
specifically wants to punish its resident in a case of this sort” (emphasis added)).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, at xix–xxii (explaining the decision to
rely heavily on the conduct-regulating/loss-allocating distinction).
62. See id. §§ 6.01–.03.
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injury.63 For contracts, it was either the place of contracting or place of
performance, depending on the type of dispute before the court.64
The Second Restatement thoroughly rejected the notion that a choice-oflaw dispute should be resolved considering one—and only one—contact.
Instead, the Second Restatement listed a plethora of contacts that might be
important for any particular case.65 For torts, the list included the place of
injury, the place of the tortious conduct, and the place where the relationship
between the parties was centered.66 For contracts, the list included the place
of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, and the
location of the contract’s subject matter.67
The Third Restatement (at least, portions of the Third Restatement for
which there is a preliminary draft) is somewhere between the First and
Second Restatements. For torts, the Third Restatement considers both the
place of wrong and the place of injury.68 For cases in which those occur in
different states (a relatively rare phenomenon, generally speaking, but one
that is more likely to trigger a choice-of-law dispute), the Third Restatement
has a preference for the law of the state of bad conduct.69 However, this
preference can, in certain circumstances, be negated in favor of the law of the
place of injury—if that is the result that the plaintiff prefers.70
Under the Rubric that I propose, a court need consider only one contact to
resolve a choice-of-law dispute. And, as discussed below, that contact will be
63. Technically, the First Restatement used the “law of the place of wrong” for torts.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (AM. L. INST. 1934) (“The law
of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.”). The place
of wrong was defined as the place “where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place.” Id. § 377. Under this definition, the place of “wrong” would
almost always be the place where the plaintiff suffered injury. See id. § 377 n.1 (“Except in
the case of harm from poison, when a person sustains bodily harm, the place of wrong is the
place where the harmful force takes effect upon the body.”). In this sense, the “place of
wrong” was an unfortunate name for the concept that the First Restatement authors were
expressing, because it suggested that the place where the defendant acted—rather than the
place where the plaintiff received injury—was controlling. For this reason, I have described
the First Restatement rule as the “place of injury” in this Article.
64. See id. § 358.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (AM. L. INST. 1971)
(listing multiple relevant contacts in a torts dispute).
66. Id.
67. See id. § 188 (listing relevant contacts in a contracts dispute).
68. The somewhat complicated way that the Third Restatement takes into consideration
both the place of injury and wrong will be discussed more fully in Part IV of this Article.
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.08(1).
70. Id. § 6.08(2).
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the contact deemed important by the First Restatement. This mostly comports
with what courts have been doing; any infidelity to the caselaw (and it is
minor) is worth the gains in simplicity.
1. Which Contact(s) Count?
In identifying one territorial contact as the controlling determination for
resolving choice of law, the First Restatement placed a premium on clarity
and ease of application.71 The Second Restatement was a reaction to the
perceived failings of the First Restatement.72 At the time, the “inflexible”
nature of the First Restatement’s rules was thought to be the problem. 73 As
such, the Second Restatement provides an approach to resolving choice of
law; this approach is malleable enough that courts are often free to resolve a
choice-of-law dispute in a variety of ways under the guise of the Second
Restatement.74
With the Third Restatement, the pendulum seems to be swinging back
towards the First Restatement’s “rules” and away from the Second
Restatement’s “approach.”75 As part of this process, there seems to be a
reevaluation of the inflexible “problem” associated with the First Restatement
that was in need of fixing. Perhaps the First Restatement problem was not so
much the rules-based approach to restating choice of law, but rather that
those rules were asking the wrong questions and, thus, getting the wrong
answers.
Thus, one way to understand the Third Restatement’s mission is that it
attempts to take the learning from modern choice of law—the primary one
being that choice of law must analyze whether states have an interest in
having their law apply—and to capture these insights in the form of rules.
71. See Ankur Mandhania, Second-Order Choice of Law in Bankruptcy, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 739, 763 (2014) (“Additionally, the Restatement (First) is particularly useful because
the rules are notoriously clear and direct . . . .”).
72. See John R. Leathers, Choice of Law in Kentucky, 87 KY. L.J. 583, 586–87 (1999)
(describing how the perceived failings of the First Restatement influenced the direction of
the Second Restatement).
73. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The ALI’s Complex Litigation Project: Commencing
the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843, 856 (1994) (“The rules of the first Restatement
were too rigid and mechanical, leaving no room for evolution.”).
74. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1183–84 (2000) (describing how the “baseline presumptions”
of the Second Restatement sanction “whatever the courts want to do”).
75. See Robert A. Sedler, Choice of Law in Conflicts Torts Cases: A Third Restatement
or Rules of Choice of Law?, 75 IND. L.J. 615, 615 (2000) (“A major impetus behind the
proposal for a third conflicts restatement is the purported uncertainty and lack of
predictability in American conflicts law today.”).
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That is also the mission of this Article. This mission is best served by limiting
a contacts-based analysis to one contact only.
It is important to remember that the contacts considered here are only a
means to an end. Under the First Restatement, identifying the state where the
relevant contact occurred resolved the choice-of-law dispute.76 Here, contacts
are considered as a means to determine whether the state in which the contact
occurred has an interest in having its law apply. But this analysis (Step Two
under the Rubric) is only one of the ways by which a state interest might be
found.
Thus, focusing only on one contact does not bring choice of law back to
the “old” days where choice-of-law analysis depended solely on identifying
the state where the relevant contact occurred. Here, the contact is important
because it might (or might not) create a state interest. But the contacts-based
approach is only one of the ways by which a state interest might be
determined (the domicile-based approach being the other). Using one contact
only will not make choice of law “mechanical” or “formulistic.” It just makes
the contact-based approach for identifying a state interest much easier for
courts to apply.
Expanding the list of relevant contacts from one to many makes choice of
law more difficult. If there are multiple contacts to consider in each case, and
if those contacts occur in different states, are those contacts to be weighted?
If not weighted, the number of states who might have an interest in the
litigation will be expanded. This will create more true-conflicts cases in
which more than one state has an interest. True conflicts are the hardest type
of case to resolve.77 Anything that increases the number of true conflicts
makes choice of law more difficult.
It is true, of course, that more than one contact might trigger state interests
in any particular dispute. For instance, in a product liability suit, the state
where the product was designed might have an interest in having its law

76. See LITTLE, supra note 2, at 167.
77. See Michael S. Green, The Return of the Unprovided-For Case, 51 GA. L. REV. 763,
776 (2017) (“Although all interest analysis approaches generally come to the same
conclusion about false conflicts, they disagree about how true conflicts should be
resolved.”).
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applied to the dispute.78 And so might the state where the product was
purchased.79 Similarly for the state of injury.80
But 100% accuracy in identifying state interests should not be the goal. 81
With regard to choice of law, perfect is often the enemy of good. Here, the
benefits to courts and litigants of focusing on one contact are worth the cost
of occasionally disregarding a state that might have a contact-based interest
that is triggered by a contact other than the one identified under choice-of-law
rules.82
If only one contact is to be considered, it should be the contact identified
by the First Restatement. First, the contact identified by the First Restatement
has tended to be that contact that is used even outside of the First
Restatement.83 Although the Second Restatement expands the list of relevant
contacts, the Second Restatement has numerous provisions that create
presumptions in favor of a particular contact.84 Notably, these contacts are
usually the contact identified in the First Restatement. 85
Similarly, courts tend to gravitate towards the First Restatement contacts
whenever a territorial type of analysis is required. 86 An example of this is
borrowing statutes. Borrowing statutes frequently require a court to identify
where a cause arose. This is a territorial analysis. Not surprisingly, courts
frequently use the First Restatement contacts when trying to determine where
78. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 895, 909 (Ill. 2007)
(concluding that Illinois, the state where the defective product was designed, had an interest
in applying its law to the dispute).
79. See, e.g., Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 877 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 1995)
(concluding that the District of Columbia, where the defective product was purchased, had
an interest in applying its law to the dispute).
80. See Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 896, 909 (concluding that Michigan, where the
defective product was purchased, had an interest in applying its law to the dispute).
81. Indeed, the Second Restatement implicitly concedes this point by narrowing the
relevant contacts to a list of three or four. Although this list is more expansive, it might also
be underinclusive in any particular choice-of-law dispute.
82. Of course, the state whose contact-based interest is ignored might nevertheless have
a domicile-based interest. This also serves to temper the concerns associated with limiting
the contact-based approach to only one contact.
83. See Shirley A. Wiegand, Getting Nowhere: Florida’s Failed Choice of Law
Approach to Torts and a Proposal for Change, 8 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
84. See id. (“The Restatement (Second) requires courts to apply the law of the place of
injury unless that presumption is overcome.”).
85. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 147–148 (AM. L. INST.
1971).
86. See, e.g., Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341, 351 (Wyo. 1979) (using the First
Restatement tort rules to determine “where” the cause of action arose under the Wyoming
“borrowing statute”).
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a cause of action arose.87 The First Restatement can be rightly criticized for
ignoring state interests, but the First Restatement successfully uses territorial
contacts analysis.
Second, using the First Restatement contact as the basis for determining
whether there is a contacts-based state interest takes advantage of all the
accumulated thinking and experience with the First Restatement contacts.
Normally, identifying the state where an injury occurs will be relatively
straightforward, but difficult cases occasionally arise. This will be true of any
contact. Picking a contact whose edges have already been clarified in existing
cases prevents courts from having to repeat the same process with a “new”
contact. Choice of law needs simplification. Picking the First Restatement
contact is, by far, the simplest contact to consider going forward.
2. Does the Contact Create an Interest?
The existence of a contact within a state does not necessarily create an
interest. Instead, the content of that state’s law must be examined to
determine whether the policy supporting the law is triggered by the contact in
that state.
As explained above, courts have employed the distinction between
“conduct-regulating” laws and “loss-allocating” laws to ascertain whether a
territorial contact creates an interest in the state in which it occurred. 88
Conduct-regulating laws do; loss-allocating laws do not.89
The Third Restatement attempts to categorize laws as either conductregulating or loss-allocating. Guest statutes and charitable immunity rules are
loss-allocating;90 “requirements for liability” and “scope of liability” are
conduct-regulating.91 In total, there are nine categories of conduct-regulating
rules and ten categories of loss-allocating rules.92
For two reasons, the Third Restatement’s effort to create a list of conductregulating and loss-allocating rules is misguided. First, from an analytical
standpoint, the Third Restatement list seems to forget that horizontal choice
of law occurs when parties ask for two (or more) states’ laws to apply. Thus,
in any choice-of-law dispute, the parties will advocate for two different laws
to apply (or at least two versions of the “same” law). A choice-of-law dispute
87.
1971).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 147–148 (AM. L. INST.
See supra note 61.
See supra note 62.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.03.
See id. § 6.02.
See id. §§ 6.02–.03.
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does not involve “one” law. Thus, any attempt to create categorical lists,
based on the law involved in a choice-of-law dispute, is analytically
misguided.
Second, even if it were possible to identify the law involved in a choice-oflaw dispute, requiring a law to be categorized as either conduct-regulating or
loss-allocating will ultimately involve courts in exceedingly difficult line
drawing. The Third Restatement authors concede that the process of
assembling the list of conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules was
difficult and tedious; the authors also admit that their list is not exhaustive. 93
Under the Third Restatement, then, courts will be forced to draw the line
between what is conduct-regulating and loss-allocating. This trends toward
“quaking quagmires” and “dismal swamp[s].”94
a) The Third Restatement Categories: An Analytical Critique
Courts perform a choice-of-law analysis only when they are asked to do so
by the parties. If the parties agree on the applicable law, a judge need not
perform a choice-of-law analysis.95 Thus, when a court is asked to resolve a
choice-of-law dispute, it is necessarily picking between law from distinct
jurisdictions. Moreover, these laws are different enough that it is worth the
attorneys’ fees to fight over the choice-of-law issue.
Given the adversarial context in which horizontal choice of law occurs, a
fundamental problem arises with the Third Restatement’s attempt to identify
certain rules as being either conduct-regulating or loss-allocating: Whose rule
counts?
Consider the infamous case of Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.96 In
Schultz, a New Jersey plaintiff brought suit in New York against a New
Jersey defendant for sexual abuse that had occurred in New York. 97
Consistent with the later-drafted Third Restatement, New York had no
interest in applying its pro-recovery rules to the case because New Jersey had

93. See id. § 6.01 cmt. a (describing the Restatement lists in sections 6.02 and 6.03 as
“nonexclusive”).
94. See Prosser, supra note 29, at 971.
95. Choice of law is not jurisdictional in the sense that it implicates a court’s power. As
such, courts do not affirmatively reach out to identify choice-of-law disputes, and a party can
waive the issue by failing to raise a choice-of-law argument. See LITTLE, supra note 2, at
192 (“The failure to raise a choice of law problem at an early time can result in a finding of
waiver for the purposes of appeal.”).
96. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
97. Id. at 681.
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a charitable immunity doctrine that protected the defendant from liability.98
Using the same terminology as the Third Restatement, the New York court
held that “the” law involved in the case was loss-allocating because New
Jersey’s charitable immunity rules were best described as pursuing lossallocating goals rather than conduct-regulating goals.99 But this analysis
completely ignores the goals of New York law, which was conductregulating.100
Suppose that, after the Schultz case, the exact same fact pattern repeats
itself one year later. Also suppose that during that year New Jersey abolishes
its charitable immunity doctrine. According to the Third Restatement, New
York’s interest as the place where the injury occurred is now controlling.101
In reality, of course, New York’s interest in applying its pro-recovery rules to
the case is the same under either fact pattern. The only change is New
Jersey’s views on how such cases can be handled. But New Jersey’s views
cannot determine whether New York has an interest in a case. Yet, under the
Third Restatement’s list approach, the content of New Jersey law determines
whether New York has an interest in regulating the conduct that occurred
within New York.102
Another problem with the Third Restatement’s list approach—in which
laws are labelled as being either loss-allocating or conduct-regulating103—is
that it is oblivious to where the contacts in a particular case occurred. Recall
that, under a modern choice-of-law analysis, contacts are thought to be
relevant simply as means to an end: A contact within a state may or may not
trigger that state’s interest in having its law applied to the dispute.104 But
under the Third Restatement list approach, the conclusion as to whether states
have a contact-based interest ignores where the relevant contact occurred. If
a guest statute is involved, the dispute is loss-allocating (and, presumably, no
contacts-based interest is triggered) regardless of where the accident
occurred. It is defensible for New Jersey’s loss-allocating rules to be
98. See id. at 683; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.03 (defining charitable
immunity as a loss-allocating issue).
99. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 686 (“[T]he rule in conflict is loss-allocating rather than
conduct-regulating.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, §6.03 (defining charitable
immunity rules as loss-allocating).
100. The Schultz court failed to appreciate that New York has a clear interest in
preventing assaults within New York. For further discussion of this analytical deficiency, see
infra, p. 38.
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, §6.04.
102. See generally id. §6.03.
103. Id. §§ 6.02–.03.
104. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
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determinative when an injury occurs within New Jersey, but it is bewildering
for the content of New Jersey law to be controlling for an injury that occurs
in New York. Yet, under the Third Restatement approach, the mere existence
of New Jersey’s charitable immunity doctrine makes the case a lossallocating case, regardless of the content of New York law and regardless of
where the accident actually occurred.
The Restatement’s classification of laws as being conduct-regulating or
loss-allocating is an attempt to make choice of law easier; I certainly applaud
these efforts. But I believe that the Third Restatement is missing the forest for
the trees: courts introduced the loss-allocating and conduct-regulating
concepts as part of an effort to determine which contacts create state interests.
The Third Restatement formalizes this process in such a way that it is
difficult to even remember why we are asking the conduct-regulating/lossallocating question. The contact itself—that is, where the contact occurred in
a particular dispute—is lost in the shuffle.
b) The Third Restatement Categories: A Practical Critique
Even if the Third Restatement’s conduct-regulating/loss-allocating lists
were analytically sound, there is a more practical problem: these lists are not
exhaustive. Thus, when litigants are confronted with a case that the lists
cannot resolve, they will have to litigate whether a rule is conduct-regulating
or loss-allocating.105
This might not be overly problematic if this classification task were easily
performed. But this is not an easy line to draw—a fact that the Third
Restatement concedes.106
Most laws have both conduct-regulating and loss-allocating aspirations.
Thus, characterizing such laws as one or the other requires determining the
“predominant purpose of a rule.”107 This is a complicated task that choice of
law could do without.

105. In actual litigation, the parties will probably appreciate the analytical point made
above, which is that a horizontal choice-of-law dispute involves two rules. This complicates
any attempt to apply the conduct-regulating/loss-allocating distinction because there are
probably different values being served by the two different rules in the choice-of-law
dispute.
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.02 cmt. a (conceding “difficult cases”
in drawing the conduct-regulating/loss-allocating distinction); see also Patrick J. Borchers,
How “International” Should a Third Conflicts Restatement Be in Tort and Contract?, 27
DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L. LAW 461, 480–81 (2017) (discussing the difficulties of
categorically listing laws as being either conduct-regulating or loss-allocating).
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.02 cmt. a.
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c) Simplification: Plaintiff-Preferred Laws Are Conduct-Regulating
The Rubric incorporates the fundamental concept that drives the conductregulating/loss-allocating distinction: namely, that not every contact creates
an interest and that the content of state laws should be considered when
determining whether a contact creates an interest.
The Rubric greatly simplifies this analysis, however, by reducing the
analysis to a simple question: Does the First Restatement contact occur in a
jurisdiction with law preferred by the plaintiff in the choice-of-law dispute? If
so, that state has an interest in the litigation. If, however, the contact occurs in
a jurisdiction whose law is preferred by the defendant in the choice-of-law
dispute, no contact-based state interest exists.
One way to view the Rubric is that it equates conduct-regulating rules as
being plaintiff-preferred and loss-allocating rules as being defendantpreferred. This closely aligns with the Third Restatement’s lists. Most of the
laws listed as loss-allocating rules are defendant friendly, while most of the
laws described as conduct-regulating rules are liability-creating, plaintifffriendly rules.108
In a large number of cases that have found a territorial contact created a
state interest, the state where the contact occurred had law favored by the
plaintiff in the choice-of-law dispute.109 It is an obvious and intuitive
argument as to why a state has an interest in applying its pro-plaintiff law to
an event that occurred in that state: By allowing for the recovery desired by
the plaintiff, the state is regulating the defendant’s conduct and deterring
others from engaging in this injury-causing type of behavior. Thus, for
instance, a state might have an interest in allowing recovery for the victim of
a sexual assault that occurred in that state, even though a different
jurisdiction’s law might shield the defendant under a doctrine such as
charitable immunity. The argument is obvious as to why the contact creates a
state interest: “Don’t commit sexual assault in our state!” This explains why

108. A major difference between the Rubric and the Third Restatement lists, though, is
that the Rubric is cognizant of the context in which courts must resolve choice-of-law
disputes. Under the Rubric, for every choice-of-law dispute, there will be a conductregulating rule (the law preferred by the plaintiff) and a loss-allocating rule (the law
preferred by the defendant). Under the Third Restatement approach, the label “conductregulating” or “loss-allocating” will be applied to a dispute, even though the dispute involves
two states with two different laws motivated by different policy objectives.
109. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Super. Ct., 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112–13 (Cal. 1974) (holding
that California, as the place of injury, had an interest in applying its plaintiff-friendly law
regarding damages).
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courts have accepted the state-interest argument when the contact occurs in a
state with a plaintiff-preferred law.
Admittedly, there are some cases in which courts have found a contactsbased interest to exist, even when the state in which the relevant contact
occurred had a law favored by the defendant.110 In most of these cases, the
courts concluded that a jurisdiction’s defendant-preferred rule was conductregulating because the law was trying to encourage the general type of
behavior engaged in by the defendant. The courts did not believe that the
state was trying to encourage the specific injury-causing behavior of the
defendant, but rather the more general class of behavior in which the
defendant was engaged. The California Supreme Court’s opinion in McCann
v. Foster Wheeler, LLC111 is a good example of this logic.
In McCann, the California Supreme Court considered whether to apply the
California statute of limitations or an Oklahoma statute of repose to a suit
brought by a California domiciliary based on asbestos exposure that had
occurred in Oklahoma.112 The intermediate California appellate court had
determined that Oklahoma had no interest in applying its law to the case
because the defendant seeking the benefit of the Oklahoma law was not an
Oklahoma domiciliary.113 The California Supreme Court concluded,
however, that Oklahoma (where the exposure had occurred) had a contactsbased interest, even though the defendant preferred the Oklahoma law in that
case.114 Oklahoma did not, of course, want to encourage the specific behavior
that had caused the injury in McCann—exposure to asbestos. According to
the McCann court, however, Oklahoma had an interest in providing liability
protection for the general class of behavior in which the defendant was
engaged:
When a state adopts a rule of law limiting liability for commercial
activity conducted within the state in order to provide what the
state perceives is fair treatment to, and an appropriate incentive
110. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844–45 (7th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that Mexico, as the place of injury, had in interest in applying its pro-defendant
contributory negligence defense).
111. 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010).
112. Id. at 518. California has a borrowing statute, but the McCann court conceded that
the borrowing statute might not have been applicable in the case. See id. at 524–27. The
McCann court then proceeded to explain why the Oklahoma statute of repose had to be
applied in that case (pursuant to California’s normal choice-of-law analysis) even if the
borrowing statute did not require that result. Id. at 526–38.
113. Id. at 522–24.
114. Id. at 530–31.
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for, business enterprises, we believe that the state ordinarily has an
interest in having that policy of limited liability applied to out-ofstate companies that conduct business in the state, as well as to
businesses incorporated or headquartered within the state. A state
has a legitimate interest in attracting out-of-state companies to do
business within the state, both to obtain tax and other revenue that
such businesses may generate for the state, and to advance the
opportunity of state residents to obtain employment and the
products and services offered by out-of-state companies. . . . [A]s
a practical and realistic matter the state[] [does have an] interest in
having that law applied to the activities of out-of-state companies
within the jurisdiction . . . .115
There are other cases using similar logic to find a contact-based interest in
a jurisdiction having defendant-preferred law.116 However, the number of
cases rejecting a contact-based interest for a state having a defendantpreferred law greatly dwarfs the few cases in which an interest has been
found.
In the interests of clarity and simplicity, the Rubric excludes a contactbased state interest in a jurisdiction that had a defendant-friendly law. The
reasoning here parallels the argument that a state has a domicile-based
interest in applying its law to the detriment of a litigant (the “punish theory”).
In each instance, a logical explanation can be offered in support of this state
interest argument. Additionally, although there is almost no support for this
theory in the caselaw,117 there are some cases recognizing a contact-based
interest for a state having a defendant-friendly law and a domicile-based
interest for a state in applying its law against its domiciliary.118 That said, the
115. Id. at 530.
116. See Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 917 A.2d 767, 775–76 (N.J. 2007) (finding
that Michigan, as the place of purchase and injury in a products liability suit, had an interest
in applying its defendant-preferred law so as to make prescription drugs more generally
available to Michigan residents, and at a cheaper price); Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil
Co., 583 P.2d 721, 725 (Cal. 1978) (finding that Louisiana, as the place of injury, had an
interest in applying its defendant-preferred law so as to avoid “extended financial hardship”
to the negligence defendant acting within Louisiana). Professor Singer has cleverly deemed
this style of argument to be “conduct liberating” rather than “conduct-regulating.” See
Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the Conflict
of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923, 1933 (“The defendant-protecting policy of Colorado in
Bryant, however, was not a loss-allocating rule. It was a conduct-liberating rule; by
decreasing potential damages, it was intended to promote business activity in Colorado.”).
117. See generally supra note 116.
118. See supra note 41.
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benefits involved with simplifying choice of law far exceed the costs of
occasionally “missing” the contact-based interest a state has in applying its
defendant-preferred law.119
C. Cases the Rubric Gets Wrong
The Rubric accounts for most of the ways in which courts have determined
that a state has an interest in applying its law to a choice-of-law dispute.
When considering the different ways that jurisdictions might choose to
resolve either a true-conflict case (a case in which more than one state has an
interest) or an unprovided-for case (a case in which no state has an interest),
the Rubric can be reconciled with a very large percentage of the holdings in
horizontal choice-of-law disputes.
That said, the Rubric is not perfect. There is one tort law fact pattern where
the Rubric clearly gives the wrong answer. Moreover, I do not suggest
applying the Rubric to property cases.
1. A Funky Tort Law Fact Pattern
The Rubric produces the wrong result in a particular type of torts case.
Fortunately, this fact pattern involves a choice-of-law dispute so preposterous
that it is doubtful to occur frequently in actual litigation.
The fact pattern that the Rubric gets wrong is a (1) joint domicile case
involving (2) an accident in a different jurisdiction (3) with a defendantpreferred rule that (4) is an obviously conduct-regulating “rule of the road,”
such as a speed limit or a traffic rule regarding engine braking.
Such a case could be depicted as such:

Under the Rubric, this is a false-conflicts case. New York has a
domicile-based interest in applying its plaintiff-preferred law on behalf of
119. Here again, it is worth noting that the normative perspective of this Article is not a
freedom that the Restatement—whose job is to descriptively restate that law—enjoys.
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the plaintiff from New York. Ontario has no domicile-based interest, as
there is no Ontario domiciliary. Ontario is the place of the injury, but
because Ontario’s law is defendant friendly, Ontario’s interest is not
triggered under the Rubric.
But this cannot be the correct result. As Judge Fuld recognized as early
as Babcock, it would be almost “unthinkable” to apply another
jurisdiction’s “rule of the road”: “It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario’s
interest is quite different from what it would have been had the issue related
to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time of
the accident.”120
The reason that the Rubric reaches the wrong answer in this fact pattern
is the Rubric’s assumption that a contact-based state interest cannot be
created when a jurisdiction has a defendant-preferred rule. Here, the
defendant prefers Ontario law, but if this dispute involves a “rule of the
road,” then Ontario has a conduct-regulating interest in applying its law to
the accident that occurred on its road, even though Ontario’s law is
defendant-preferred.
So, the assumption that defendant-preferred laws do not give rise to a
contacts-based interest is not perfect. This means that the Rubric is not
perfect.
Not all is lost, however. Despite the Rubric’s clear mistake in this
choice-of-law dispute, the notion that anything other than the accident
state’s “rule of the road” should apply is so ridiculous that this conclusion
can be easily reached without a difficult choice-of-law analysis. This
becomes apparent when we plug actual laws into our fact pattern.
Suppose that the choice-of-law dispute concerns whether the defendant
was speeding and thus negligent per se. Under New York law, the speed
limit is fifty-five miles per hour. The plaintiff wants New York law to apply
because the defendant was driving sixty-five miles per hour at the time of
the accident. The defendant, however, wants Ontario law to apply;
Ontario’s speed limit is seventy-five miles per hour. Here again we can
depict the fact pattern, substituting the actual law requested by each party:

120. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963).
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The Rubric suggests that this is a false-conflicts case: New York has a
domicile-based interest. Ontario does not have a potential contacts-based
interest because Ontario’s law is preferred by the defendant.
But the plaintiff’s argument is too outlandish for any litigant to even
contemplate asserting in actual litigation: What the plaintiff is asserting
here is that the defendant “breached per se” because he violated the New
York fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit when he was driving sixty-five
miles per hour on an Ontario road. For this “rule of the road,” the conductregulating nature of Ontario’s law is blatantly evident; thus, Ontario law
should apply.
In the event a litigant does make this type of far-fetched argument, a
court should obviously deviate from the Rubric to reach the correct result.
(The use of the term “Rubric,” rather than “rule,” was intentional.)
The types of choice-of-law disputes that courts deal with in real life,
however, are not usually cases where a party is claiming that a New York
speed limit applies on an Ontario highway. 121 In actual choice-of-law
disputes, the existence of a contact-based state interest will not be obvious.
In these instances, I believe the Rubric is very helpful to courts. But courts
should (of course) bypass the Rubric when its application would lead to an
obviously incorrect result.
2. Property Disputes
Property cases have long been controlled by the “situs” rule, 122 even after
modern choice of law required courts to engage in a state-interest
121. Professor Symeonides documents a few cases where a plaintiff attempted to argue
that a defendant’s conduct should not be measured by the “rules of the road” where the
defendant’s conduct occurred. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 19, at 232–36. Predictably,
courts in those cases had no trouble concluding that the defendant’s conduct must be
measured by the law of the state where the conduct occurred. See id.
122. Under the situs rule, “the existence or non-existence of title of the chattel is
determined by the law of the place where it was physically located at the point the title is
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analysis.123 As courts have not tended to use a state-interest analysis in
resolving property choice-of-law disputes, 124 I do not advocate applying the
Rubric to property cases. The territorial situs rule works very well, and it
should be left alone.
IV. Consistency with Third Restatement Results and a Word on Tiebreakers
In this Part, I address how the Rubric compares to the results under the
Third Restatement and also offer my thoughts on the best way to resolve
true conflicts and unprovided-for cases.
A. Third Restatement Results
1. Summary
The Third Restatement is in various stages of completion, but the portion
addressing choice of law for torts has proceeded to draft form. As such, it is
possible to compare the results that the Rubric reaches with the results
under the current draft of the Third Restatement.
The process of comparing the results under the Rubric with the results
under the Third Restatement gets somewhat tricky and technical for a
variety of reasons. For readers disinclined to get into the weeds, I offer this
quick summary over the following few paragraphs.
The simple Rubric I have proposed reaches the same results as the Third
Restatement in a supermajority of fact patterns. 125 In over 71% of tort law
fact patterns, the Rubric and the Third Restatement reach the exact same
result.

alleged to have been created.” See Monique Lee, A Choice of Law Dilemma: The Conflict
and Reconciliation of Laws Governing Cross-Border Transfers of Stolen Art, 7 CARDOZO
PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 719, 722–23 (2009).
123. Id. (discussing ubiquity of the rule).
124. See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and
Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 671 (2013) (“Even today, for instance, American
lawyers think it natural for various issues relating to real property to be adjudicated
according to the law of the place where the property is located . . . .”).
125. As explained previously, the Rubric requires a process for resolving true conflict
and unprovided-for cases. See supra text accompanying notes 22–30. As explained later in
this Part, I propose using a tiebreaker that defaults to the First Restatement rule. See infra
Section IV.B. Thus, in this section, in describing the results reached by the Rubric in tort
cases, I will be resolving true conflicts and unprovided-for cases by applying the law of the
place of injury (the First Restatement rule). Obviously, should a jurisdiction choose to
resolve true conflicts and unprovided-for cases differently, this would change the data as to
the consistency of results between the Rubric and the Third Restatement.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

366

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:337

What about the 29% of fact patterns decided differently? Half of these
fact patterns are a byproduct of the unusual Third Restatement provisions
that permit a plaintiff to pick either the law of the place of injury or the law
of the place of the defendant’s bad conduct. As explained below, it is illadvised for black-letter, choice-of-law rules to explicitly state that the
plaintiff gets to pick the law that she prefers. If these “plaintiff-gets-topick” rules are replaced by the traditional law of the place-of-injury torts
rule, then the consistency between the Rubric and the modified Third
Restatement jumps to over 85%.
The remaining 15% of fact patterns in which there are inconsistent
results between the Rubric and the Third Restatement occur for a variety of
reasons. For these fact patterns, there is usually caselaw support for both the
Rubric result and the Third Restatement result. As explained above, in one
particular type of fact pattern, the Rubric reaches the wrong result. 126 I
believe there are also fact patterns that the Third Restatement simply gets
wrong. In short, the results are pretty much the same. When the results
differ, there is usually caselaw support for the position reached by the
Rubric and the Third Restatement.
But the Rubric is much easier to apply. The Third Restatement depends
on the ability of courts to label “the” law in a torts choice-of-law dispute as
being either conduct-regulating or loss-allocating. As explained above, this
analysis is misguided (both analytically and practically).
Moreover, the Rubric is preferable because it can be used outside the
context of tort law. The Rubric identifies state interests through a generic
process that changes very little from one subject matter to the next. 127 The
current draft of Third Restatement rules, however, are specific to tort law. 128
The Third Restatement will soon publish a new set of proposed rules that
deal with contracts.129 These rules, presumably, will not incorporate the
conduct-regulating/loss-allocating distinction that the Third Restatement
rules use for tort cases. The Rubric, then, will permit judges and lawyers to
avoid not only the somewhat complicated Third Restatement torts rules but

126. See supra Section III.C.1.
127. The Rubric depends on identifying the important contact under the First
Restatement, and the First Restatement contacts depend on characterizing the dispute as
involving torts, contracts, etc. Other than this minor characterization adjustment, the Rubric
does not change from one subject matter to the next.
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, xvii.
129. See generally id. at xvii, xxxvii–xxxviii (presenting a projected Table of Contents,
which includes “Chapter 8: CONTRACTS”).
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also whatever complex rules that the Third Restatement develops for other
subject matters such as contracts.
2. Third Restatement Methodology
For torts, the Third Restatement identifies three important issues: (1)
Whether the case involves a loss-allocating rule130 or a conduct-regulating
rule;131 (2) whether the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury occur
in different states or the same state;132 and (3) whether the parties are from
the same state or different states.133
With the three variables being considered (and with each variable being
binary), there are eight possible combinations. Here are the eight options,
including how the Third Restatement proposes to resolve each case:
Loss-Allocating/
Conduct-Regulating

Same State/
Different State

Joint Domicile/
Split Domicile

1. Loss-Allocating

Different State

Joint Domicile

Law of Joint Domicile
(§ 6.06)

2. Loss-Allocating

Same State

Joint Domicile

Law of Joint Domicile
(§ 6.06)

3. Loss-Allocating

Different State

Split Domicile

Plaintiff Picks Law of
Bad Conduct or Injury

Result

134

(§6.08)

130. Recall the criticism in Part III of the Third Restatement’s presumption that one label
can be applied to the two different rules involved in a horizontal choice-of-law dispute. See
supra Section III.B.2.b.
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, §§ 6.01–.03.
132. See id. §§ 6.04, 6.07–.08.
133. See id. §§ 6.06–.07.
134. The Third Restatement section 6.08 is actually more complicated than just “the
plaintiff gets to pick.” Here is the complete text of section 6.08:
§ 6.08. Cross-Border Torts
(1) Except as otherwise provided in §§ 6.04, 6.06, and 6.07, when conduct
in one state causes injury in another, the law of the state of conduct governs
issues of conduct regulation and loss allocation.
(2) However, the law of the state of injury, rather than the state of conduct
governs all issues subject to this Section if:
(a) the occurrence of the injury in that state was objectively foreseeable;
and
(b) the injured person formally and timely requests the application of
that state’s law.
(3) Whether the defendant was under a duty to act is always determined
with reference to the law of the state of conduct, regardless of whether the
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Loss-Allocating/
Conduct-Regulating

Same State/
Different State

Joint Domicile/
Split Domicile

4. Loss-Allocating

Same State

Split Domicile

Law of Bad Conduct
(§6.07)

5. Conduct-Regulating

Different State

Joint Domicile

Plaintiff Picks Law of
Bad Conduct or Injury
(§6.08)

6. Conduct-Regulating

Same State

Joint Domicile

Law of Bad Conduct
(§6.04)

7. Conduct-Regulating

Different State

Split Domicile

Plaintiff Picks Law of
Bad Conduct or Injury
(§6.08)

8. Conduct-Regulating

Same State

Split Domicile

Law of Bad Conduct
(§6.04)

Result

Another way to restate the results reached under the Third Restatement is
as follows: Apply the law of the place of the bad conduct unless (1) it is a
joint-domicile case and “the” rule is loss-allocating; or (2) it is not a case
covered by the first exception, the state of injury and the state of bad
conduct are different, and the plaintiff prefers the law of the state of
injury. 135
Under the Rubric, there are only two questions to consider: (1) where are
the parties from and for whose law are they arguing?; and (2) did the injury
occur in a state with pro-plaintiff laws?
Things get complicated, however, when one overlays the factors
important to the Third Restatement analysis with the factors important to
the Rubric. Combining the Third Restatement factors with the Rubric
factors creates sixty-four different fact patterns.136 These are set out in
injured person selects a different law. The effect of such a duty is determined
by the law selected under this Section.
Id. § 6.08.
Assuming that (1) the occurrence of the injury to the plaintiff in the injury state was
objectively foreseeable and that (2) a plaintiff will usually make a “formal[] and timely
request[]” for the injury state’s law, the only time where the plaintiff does not truly get to
pick is when the issue is whether a “defendant was under a duty to act.” Id. For simplicity, I
have glossed over this complexity in the text.
135. As with the table, in this “restatement” of the Third Restatement provisions the
more nuanced provisions of section 6.08 have been reduced to the notion that “plaintiff gets
to pick.”
136. For purposes of this analysis, I have assumed that all of the relevant action takes
place in only two states. Things get infinitely more complicated if three (or more) states are
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Appendix A, using the states of Kansas and Nebraska for demonstrative
purposes.137
Of these sixty-four different factual scenarios, eight do not involve a
choice-of-law issue.138 The remaining fifty-six factual scenarios will be
discussed below, organized around the Third Restatement provisions under
which they are addressed.
3. Section 6.07
The fact patterns resolved by section 6.07 of the Third Restatement are
the easiest to discuss because the Third Restatement and the Rubric reach
the exact same results in these cases.
Overall, section 6.07 covers eight of the sixty-four fact patterns.139 These
are fact patterns in which the parties are domiciled in different states, the
injury and the bad conduct occur in the same state, and “the” law is lossallocating. Under section 6.07, a court is to apply the law of the state where
the injury and bad conduct occurred. 140 This is the exact result reached by
the Rubric.

involved. Even adding just a third state with contacts to the dispute enlarges the range of
different factual scenarios to around one thousand. Moreover, once more than two states are
considered, some fact pattern will fall outside the scope of the rules covered in sections 6.04,
6.06, 6.07, and 6.08 of the Third Restatement. These fact patterns would then be resolved
according to the residual rule in section 6.09, which instructs courts to apply the law of the
state with the “dominant” interest in the issue. The standard of section 6.09 (unlike the rules
contained in sections 6.04, 6.06, 6.07, and 6.08) does not definitely point to any state’s law;
thus, it is impossible to compare the results reached under section 6.09 with the results under
the Rubric. For these reasons, the discussion in this section will assume that all of the
contacts take place wholly within two states.
137. Here are the questions that produce the sixty-four different fact patterns:
1. Is Kansas law plaintiff friendly? (binary—yes or no)
2. Where are the parties from? (four options—KS/KS; KS/NE; NE/KS;
NE/NE)
3. Is Kansas the state of injury? (binary—yes or no)
4. Is Kansas the state of bad conduct? (binary—yes or no)
5. Is the law conduct-regulating? (binary—yes or no)
See infra app. A.
138. For these eight factual scenarios, all the relevant contacts are in either Kansas or
Nebraska. In Appendix A, these are fact patterns 1, 2, 31–34, 63, and 64. See infra app. A.
139. In Appendix A, these facts patterns are numbered 9, 15, 17, 23, 41, 47, 49, and 55.
See infra app. A.
140. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.07.
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4. Sections 6.04 and 6.06
Sections 6.04 and 6.06 both involve slight deviations from the Rubric.
These deviations raise the same issues and will thus be discussed as a pair.
First, section 6.04 applies to fact patterns in which (1) the injury and bad
conduct occur in the same state and (2) “the” law is conduct-regulating. 141
(This section applies to both split-domicile and joint-domicile cases.)
Section 6.04 instructs courts to apply the law of the state where the injury
and bad conduct occurred. 142
Section 6.04 applies to eleven different factual scenarios.143 In nine of
these fact patterns, the Rubric reaches the same conclusion. 144
In two fact patterns,145 however, a difference emerges between section
6.04 and the Rubric. These two fact patterns involve instances where both
the plaintiff and the defendant are from the same state—joint-domicile
cases. The two fact patterns in which section 6.04 and the Rubric deviate
are as follows:
#26
Kansas Law: Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska Law: Defendant Preferred

#40
Kansas Law: Defendant Preferred
Nebraska: Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)
Place of Injury: NE
Place of Bad Conduct: NE
Character of Law: Conduct-Regulating

P (NE) v. D (NE)
Place of Injury: KS
Place of Bad Conduct: KS
Character of Law: Conduct-Regulating

Rubric: Kansas Law
Third Restatement: Nebraska Law

Rubric: Nebraska Law
Third Restatement: Kansas Law

These two fact patterns are the mirror image of each other. In each,
residents from one state are involved in an accident in another state (which
is also where the bad conduct occurs). The place where the injury occurs
has law preferred by the defendant. Under the Third Restatement, “the” law
involved is conduct-regulating.146 Under the Rubric, the law of the joint

141.
142.
143.
A.
144.
145.
146.

See id. § 6.04.
See id.
In Appendix A, these are 8, 10, 16, 18, 26, 40, 42, 48, 50, 56 and 58. See infra app.
In Appendix A, these are 8, 10, 16, 18, 42, 48, 50, 56 and 58. See infra app. A.
In Appendix A, these are 26 and 40. See infra app. A.
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.02.
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domicile applies. Under the Third Restatement, however, the law of the
state of injury applies.147
Second, section 6.06 applies to twelve different fact patterns.148 In eight
of these, the Rubric and the Restatement reach the same conclusion. 149 In
four, however, a deviation emerges. 150 Here are the four patterns in which a
deviation exists:
#7
Kansas Law: Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska Law: Defendant Preferred

#57
Kansas Law: Defendant Preferred
Nebraska: Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)
Place of Injury: KS
Place of Bad Conduct: KS
Character of Law: Loss-Allocating

P (KS) v. D (KS)
Place of Injury: NE
Place of Bad Conduct: NE
Character of Law: Loss-Allocating

Rubric: Kansas Law
Third Restatement: Nebraska Law

Rubric: Nebraska Law
Third Restatement: Kansas Law

#5
Kansas Law: Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska Law: Defendant Preferred

#59
Kansas Law: Defendant Preferred
Nebraska: Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)
Place of Injury: KS
Place of Bad Conduct: NE
Character of Law: Loss-Allocating

P (KS) v. D (KS)
Place of Injury: NE
Place of Bad Conduct: KS
Character of Law: Loss-Allocating

Rubric: Kansas Law
Third Restatement: Nebraska Law

Rubric: Nebraska Law
Third Restatement: Kansas Law

Fact patterns 7 and 57 are the mirror image of each other: Both are jointdomicile cases involving loss-allocating rules in which the injury and bad
conduct occur in a different state whose law is favored by the plaintiff.
Under the Rubric, the law of the state of injury controls, while the Third
Restatement holds that the law of the joint domicile controls.
Fact patterns 5 and 59 are also the mirror image of each other. In fact, 5
and 59 replicate 7 and 57, with the only difference being that in 5 and 59
the bad conduct occurs in the joint-domicile state rather than the injury
147. Id. § 6.04.
148. In Appendix A, these numbers are 3, 5, 7, 25, 27, 29, 35, 37, 39, 57, 59, and 61. See
infra app. A.
149. In Appendix A, these numbers are 3, 25, 27, 29, 35, 37, 39, and 61. See infra app. A.
150. In Appendix A, these numbers are 5, 7, 57, and 59. See infra app. A.
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state. Here again, the Rubric holds that the law of the state of injury applies,
while the Third Restatement says that the law of the joint domicile applies.
Considering sections 6.04 and 6.06 as a pair, the six different types of
fact patterns in which the Rubric and the Third Restatement diverge share
core characteristics: they are joint-domicile cases in which the injury occurs
in a different state.
The joint-domicile/injury-in-another-state fact pattern has always been a
challenging one for choice of law. This type of fact pattern has been
frequently involved in the cases in which state courts moved away from the
law of the place of injury. 151 For those courts, the First Restatement
resolution—that the law of the place of wrong should always apply—was
not correct. 152
But experience has proven that this type of fact pattern cannot always be
resolved in favor of the law of the joint domicile, either. To this author’s
knowledge, no one has ever suggested that courts should always apply the
law of the joint domicile in every case in which the parties are from the
same state. All seem to agree that sometimes the law of the joint domicile
should apply, and sometimes the law of the place of injury must apply.
Alas, a line must be drawn. But what line?
The Third Restatement answers this challenge through the conductregulating/loss-allocating distinction. If “the” law involved is lossallocating, the joint-domicile law applies.153 If “the” law is conductregulating, the law of the place of injury applies. 154 Under the Rubric, the
line is drawn by asking whether the injury state has a law preferred by the
plaintiff. If so, the law of the place of injury applies. 155 If not, the law of the
joint domicile applies.
Which is better?
Each, in my view, gets certain types of cases “wrong.” As discussed
above, the Rubric errs in the following case: When the choice-of-law
dispute involves a “rule of the road,” the injury state’s rule must be applied
151. See Lea Brilmayer, What I Like Most About the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts,
and Why It Should Not Be Thrown Out with the Bathwater, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 144, 146
(2016) (describing the “universal pattern” found in cases in which state courts rejected the
First Restatement).
152. See id.
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.06.
154. Id. § 6.04. Or, in instances in which the injury and bad conduct occur in different
states, the Restatement would allow the plaintiff to pick the law that applies. See id. § 6.08.
This outcome will be discussed in Section IV.B.
155. This conclusion assumes that a jurisdiction is using the law of the place of injury as
a tiebreaker for true conflicts and unprovided-for cases.
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even if the injury state has a defendant-preferred rule.156 (In other words,
the injury state has an interest in enforcing its conduct-regulating “rule of
the road,” even if the Rubric is not identifying the defendant-preferred rule
as conduct-regulating.) But, as explained above, the notion that any other
state’s law would apply is so far-fetched that it probably will not be
necessary for courts adopting the Rubric to even use this exception: No
litigant would even think that a Nebraska speed limit applies to a Kansas
crash.
But the Restatement also gets a certain type of case wrong. The infamous
case of Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. is a prime example. 157 If
Schultz were considered under section 6.03, the case involved “a” lossallocating rule because the defendant was claiming New Jersey’s charitable
immunity. 158 As such, New York had no interest in applying its plaintiffpreferred tort law to an injury that occurred within New York. Under
section 6.06, New Jersey law would apply. This is the result that the New
York court reached in Schultz.159
I believe this is the wrong result. To say that New York has no interest in
applying its pro-recovery rule to this fact pattern is to assume that New
York has no interest in preventing assaults within New York unless the
dispute involves a New York domiciliary. This seems both callous and
inaccurate. (Indeed, The Third Restatement seems almost apologetic in
stating that section 6.06 suggests that the Schultz decision “was correct.” 160)
The Schultz decision in favor of the Boy Scouts nicely demonstrates the
analytical deficiency with the Third Restatement’s category approach:
Labelling the dispute as “a” loss-allocating case (because New Jersey has
charitable immunity doctrine) ignores that the injury occurred in New York
and that New York’s rejection of charitable immunity is clearly based on
conduct-regulating (rather than loss-allocating) objectives.
What about consistency with case results? Specifically, between the
Third Restatement and the Rubric, which approach best aligns with the
actual results reached by courts?
In considering this question, it is first important to appreciate that both
the Rubric and the Third Restatement tend to agree on results much more
frequently than they disagree. Sections 6.04 and 6.06 of the Third
Restatement address twenty-four joint-domicile fact patterns: In eighteen of
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra Section III.C.1.
480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 96–100.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 681.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, Reporters’ Notes at § 6.06, cmt. a.
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them, the Rubric and the Third Restatement reach the same results. Thus, a
discussion of which approach most closely aligns with existing caselaw
must start with the fact that, in a supermajority of cases, the Rubric and the
Third Restatement reach the same exact result.
For the portion of cases in which the Rubric and the Third Restatement
reach contrary results, there is caselaw authority for each position. For
cases in which the injury state has plaintiff-preferred law, the courts will
sometimes apply the law of the injury state (the conclusion under the
Rubric) but sometimes apply the law of the joint domicile (these are the
cases that the Third Restatement tends to label as “loss-allocating”
cases).161 Similarly, for cases in which the injury state has defendantpreferred law, the courts will sometimes apply the joint-domicile law (the
result under the Rubric) and sometimes apply the injury-state law (these are
the cases that the Third Restatement tends to label as “conductregulating”). 162 But I believe these “mixed” results are somewhat
misleading. In my view, the Third Restatement is synthesizing the caselaw
with a line that either does not exist or that is too fine to be useful going
forward.
Looking backwards, conflicting results in cases can always be explained
by imagining a retroactive rule that governs the decisions. For the fact
pattern we are considering (joint domicile with injury in a different state),
suppose that we are going to divide these cases based on results. On the left
side of our page, we will put all of the cases in which courts have applied
the law of the joint domicile. On the right side of the page, we will put all
of the cases in which courts have applied the law of the state of injury.
Having thus separated the cases, it is possible to apply a made-up label.
For the cases on the left side of the page (cases where the joint domicile
was applied), we can apply the label “wobble.” On the right side of the page
(cases where the state of injury was applied), we can apply the label
“bobble.” This process can create the impression that, for future cases
involving joint domiciles in different states, all that is necessary is to
determine whether the case is a wobble or a bobble. But, of course, unless
the wobble/bobble label represents a true analytical distinction, it is not at
all helpful for resolving future cases. The labels must mean something, and
the distinction must be relatively easy to draw.

161. See id. § 6.06.
162. See id. § 6.04.
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In my view, the Third Restatement’s conduct-regulating/loss-allocating
distinction is somewhat like the wobble/bobble distinction.163 Retroactively
speaking, the conduct-regulating/loss-allocating distinction is fairly
accurate in describing the cases in which courts have applied the joint
domicile law or the law of the place of injury. But this appearance of
accuracy is an illusion. Unless the categories mean something and can be
applied going forward,164 we might as well be talking about wobbles and
bobbles.165
In summary, the Rubric and the Third Restatement mostly reach the
same result in fact patterns covered by sections 6.04 and 6.06. For fact
patterns resolved differently, both the Rubric and the Third Restatement
reach some results that seem intuitively wrong and will occasionally require
a court to make an exception. There is some caselaw support for the results
reached by the Rubric and the Third Restatement. But the Rubric is much
easier to apply, and it will avoid courts having to discern whether a case
involves a wobble (conduct regulation) or bobble (loss allocation).
5. Section 6.08
Section 6.08 of the Third Restatement covers “cross-border” torts—that
is, torts in which the defendant’s “bad conduct” occurs in one state and the
plaintiff’s injury occurs in a different state. 166 All cross-border torts are
addressed by section 6.08, unless the cross-border tort is a joint-domicile
case involving a loss-allocating rule, in which case section 6.06 provides
the operative rule. 167 Under section 6.08, the plaintiff gets to pick the rule
that he prefers.168

163. I definitely do not mean to suggest that the Third Restatement has intentionally
created imaginary categories. Quite the opposite: I think the authors of the Third
Restatement are trying very hard to reconcile the joint-domicile cases. I just do not think the
categories created by the Third Restatement work in practice; or, at least, the distinctions
represented by the categories created by the Third Restatement are simply too much to
expect of judges having to resolve actual choice-of-law disputes.
164. As conceded by leading scholar Symeon Symeonides, the distinction is arguably
“not worth the candle.” See SYMEONIDES, supra note 19, at 249.
165. Or, for Lewis Carroll fans, “ravens” and “writing-desks.” See LEWIS CARROLL,
ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 57 (Lothrop Publ’g Co., 1898) (1865).
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.08.
167. Id. § 6.06.
168. Id. § 6.08. As previously explained, section 6.08 does provide that in a few,
particular instances the plaintiff will not be able to pick the governing law. For simplicity
and clarity, these nuances will be ignored in the analysis contained in the text.
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The fact patterns covered by section 6.08 involve the most dramatic
divergence between the Rubric and the Third Restatement. Overall, section
6.08 addresses twenty-five fact patterns.169 In fifteen of these, the Rubric
and the Third Restatement reach the same result. In ten, however, the
Rubric and the Third Restatement reach conflicting results. This divergence
is due to two reasons: (1) the unique Third Restatement provisions allowing
plaintiffs to select the law they prefer; and (2) the decision of the Third
Restatement to expand the relevant territorial contacts to include the place
of bad conduct.
In my view, section 6.08 of the Third Restatement is ill-advised. My
objection to section 6.08 is not descriptive. Section 6.08 of the Third
Restatement can be traced to the work of conflicts giant Symeon
Symeonides.170 Symeonides’s research unquestionably shows that courts
tend to resolve cross-border torts cases by applying the law that favors the
plaintiff.171 Symeonides’s thoroughness and integrity are beyond reproach. I
concede that courts tend to do exactly what the Third Restatement sanctions
in section 6.08. My objection to section 6.08, however, is normative; there
is something unseemly about black-letter law explicitly favoring one party
over another. It is even worse when the applicable law is left to a litigant’s
choice.
The plaintiff-choice provisions of section 6.08 call to mind the work of
torts scholar Robert Leflar. Leflar is most closely associated with the
“better-rule” approach, under which a court resolves a choice-of-law
dispute by simply selecting the “better rule.” 172 Descriptively speaking,
Leflar’s “better-rule” approach is somewhat useful in understanding the
results in actual cases: Judges tended to disfavor guest statutes and would
resist their application in horizontal choice-of-law disputes.173 As a realist,
descriptive assertion, recognizing what courts are actually doing (despite
the obscuring fluff contained in the opinion) is helpful to lawyers and
litigants who must make decisions based on a prediction of how courts will
rule. It is also helpful to academics who are trying to ascertain the
underlying governing dynamics. As a descriptive assertion, Leflar’s “better
rule” observation is helpful.

169. See infra app. A.
170. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 19, at 247–49.
171. See id. at 218–24.
172. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1587–88 (1966).
173. See generally id.
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But as a normative assertion of what judges should be doing, 174 Leflar’s
“better-rule” approach is misguided. Inviting judges to resolve choice of
law by simply applying the law the judge prefers undermines confidence in
the rule of law. It discredits the authority of judges. It undercuts the repose
that occurs when litigants feel they have had their fair day in court. Leflar’s
“better-rule” approach is fine as a descriptive observation, but it fails as a
normative assertion. Just because judges are doing it does not mean that
they should be doing it.
Section 6.08 of the Third Restatement is similarly misguided. It is one
thing for Professor Symeonides to notice a plaintiff-friendly trend in crossborder cases. It is quite another for the Third Restatement to sanction this
bias as an official part of the black-letter law.
In some respects, the provisions of section 6.08 are even more
problematic than Leflar’s better-rule approach. Leflar’s better-rule approach
invites judges to inject their biases, prejudices, and values into cases.
Section 6.08 cuts out the middle person and just leaves it to the whim of the
plaintiff. The notion that human bias will sometimes influence the way a
judge handles a case is something that most citizens can probably anticipate
and accept. The idea that the black-letter law itself is explicitly biased in
favor of plaintiffs—such that plaintiffs get to resolve choice of law
according to their preference—is much more damaging to the system.
Judges are human; the law should strive to be neutral.
Of course, every rule (at base) rests on policy considerations and has
winners and losers. But rarely will a court justify a rule simply on the
notion that it helps a particular party.175 A common law rule might help
plaintiffs (or defendants), but this is usually a means to an end: “The rule
allows for recovery here because [insert policy].” Section 6.08 of Third
Restatement is missing the “because”: “The rule allows for recovery, and
thus it is a good one.”
This difference between a rule that helps a plaintiff “because [policy]”
and a rule that exists simply because it helps the plaintiff distinguishes the
explicit bias of section 6.08’s “plaintiff-picks” rule from the Rubric’s
174. It is not clear that Professor Leflar ever proposed that his better rule approach
should be used; instead, most view Leflar’s work as descriptive in nature. See Mark
Thomson, Method or Madness?: The Leflar Approach to Choice of Law as Practiced in Five
State, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 82 (2013) (“Leflar’s goal was not to pioneer some novel
choice-of-law theory, but, rather, to refocus scholarly and judicial attention on choice of law
as it actually worked in the real world.”).
175. See generally CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 (Jud. Conf. U.S. 2019)
(“The judge . . . should not engage in behavior that is . . . biased . . . .”).
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conclusion that a state interest exists when a territorial contact occurs in a
state with a plaintiff-preferred law. Under the Rubric, the interest created
when a territorial contact occurs in a jurisdiction with a plaintiff-friendly
law is based on the notion that the convergence of a remedy and an event in
the same state creates an interest under a choice-of-law analysis. This is
different than saying, “Whatever helps the plaintiff, that is the rule.”
I hope that the current draft of section 6.08 is ultimately rejected. People,
and even institutions, can be biased. The law should not explicitly be.
The other concern with section 6.08 is that it expands the relevant
territorial contacts. For the history of American choice of law, the relevant
territorial contact for torts has been the place of injury. 176 This was the
bright-line rule adopted by the First Restatement. 177 This was the default
contact for numerous Second Restatement provisions. 178 Under section
6.08, however, the place of the defendant’s bad conduct is now included as
a relevant territorial contact.179
I understand the analytical reasons for including the place of bad conduct
as a relevant territorial contact, and there is caselaw support for this
change. 180 But it is not worth the trouble. What American choice of law
needs is simplification, not complication. Indeed, that is the stated goal of
the drafters of the Third Restatement. 181 But expanding the relevant
territorial contacts from one to two is pulling in the opposite direction,
away from simplicity and clarity.
The Rubric is simple and clear. If section 6.08 were replaced with the
law of the place of wrong rather than the current “plaintiff-picks”
provisions, the convergence between the Rubric and the Third Restatement
would jump from 15/25 to 23/25. At this point, the Rubric and the Third
Restatement would converge in forty-eight of fifty-six fact patterns. If
courts do not like the “plaintiff-picks” provisions of the Third Restatement,
they might as well use the Rubric. In 85% of cases, the Rubric and the
Third Restatement would then reach this same conclusion, but the Rubric
would get there in an easier, more straightforward fashion.
176. See Joseph William Singer, Choice of Law Rules, 50 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 347, 350
(2020) (“The traditional approach under with the First or Second Restatement would be to
apply the law of the place of the injury.”).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 6.08.
180. See id. at § 6.08 cmt. d (discussing courts’ application of the law of the state of bad
conduct).
181. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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B. A Word on Tiebreakers
The Rubric is a tool for determining whether state interests exist. In
instances in which only one state has an interest (a “false conflict”), the
choice-of-law issue is resolved: Apply the law of the only state that has an
interest in applying its law to the dispute. When more than one state has an
interest (a “true conflict”) or no state has an interest, the choice-of-law
analysis must proceed.
A variety of approaches have been used to resolve true conflicts and
unprovided-for cases. In one camp are the approaches that invite courts to
engage in a balancing or weighing process. 182 For instance, at one time New
Jersey resolved true conflicts cases by applying the law of the state “with
the greatest interest in governing the particular issue.”183 Along the same
lines, California employs the “comparative-impairment” approach, under
which the court applies the law of the state whose interest would be more
impaired if it were not applied. 184
These balancing-type approaches suffer from two shortcomings. First,
the process of balancing interests or impairments is tedious. But choice-oflaw analysis needs to be simplified, and weighing and balancing is a step in
the wrong direction. Weighing interests or impairments in a choice-of-law
case is akin to balancing feathers on a teeter-totter: The instrument being
used is not sensitive enough for the task. Moreover, the case-specific nature
of balancing tests limits their usefulness in resolving future cases. Thus, the
blood, sweat, and tears involved in balancing interests or impairments is
unlikely to be useful to a court handling a subsequent choice-of-law
dispute, meaning that the tedious process must be repeated.
Second, balancing-type approaches are only useful for resolving trueconflicts cases. In an unprovided-for case, there are no interests or
impairments to weigh or compare. A jurisdiction that wants to balance,
then, will need a different approach for resolving unprovided-for cases. A
solution that works to resolve both true conflicts and unprovided-for cases
is preferable.
Rather than weighing or balancing, the simplicity of a tiebreaker is
preferable. Here again, many different tiebreakers have been proposed and
used. Professor Leflar wrote that a court would simply pick the jurisdiction

182. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 628 A.2d 305, 309 (N.J. 1993).
184. See Albert C. Lin, Dodging Public Nuisance, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 489, 517, 517
n.199 (2020) (noting California’s use of comparative impairment).
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that has the “better rule.”185 In the Third Restatement, for certain types of
torts cases, the court is instructed to apply the law that is preferred by the
plaintiff in the litigation. 186 In my opinion, both of these tiebreakers are
misguided.
What is needed is an (1) easy-to-apply tiebreaker (2) that resolves both
true conflicts and unprovided-for cases and (3) is neutral with regard to the
parties and the content of the laws involved in the choice-of-law dispute. In
this camp, there are two candidates: (1) the law of the forum and (2) the law
selected under the First Restatement.
Using the law of the forum was the tiebreaker preferred by Professor
Currie, 187 who in many ways is the intellectual forefather of modern interest
analysis.188 It is a fine option. Many jurisdictions have used this tiebreaker,
either explicitly189 or implicitly.190 And there is something intuitive about
the notion that a forum should apply its own rules. 191
I have a slight preference, however, for a different tiebreaker: the law
identified under the First Restatement approach. First, notice that for a court
applying the Rubric, no additional work will be necessary in applying this
tiebreaker; the relevant contact under the First Restatement would already
have been identified under the Rubric. Second, using the law selected under
the First Restatement is probably truer to the motivations that initially
pushed courts away from the First Restatement approach.
185. See supra text accompanying note 172.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 168.
187. See supra note 26.
188. See Rodney Patton, Sisyphus, the Boulder, and the Choice-of-Law Hill: The
Analytical Framework for Resolving the Unusual and Complex Choice-of-Law Issues That
Can Arise When the United States is a Party in an Aviation Case, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 471,
475 (2006) (identifying Currie as the father of the “government interest” analysis).
189. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 549 (Or. 1964) (holding that forum
law should be used in resolving a true conflicts).
190. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471–73
(Mich. 1997) (holding that Michigan law applies unless a rational reason to displace
Michigan law exists, and then explaining that in a false-conflicts case in which Michigan
does not have an interest, a rational reason to depart from forum law would exist); see also
Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts, 47 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 683, 686 (2015)
(citation omitted) (noting the tendency of state courts to “fall back on forum law in a
pinch”).
191. Indeed, some jurisdictions have either adopted, purported to adopt, or flirted with a
lex fori rule, in which all choice-of-law disputes (not just true conflicts and unprovided-for
cases) are resolved by using forum law. See LITTLE, supra note 2, at 514 (“[A]t least three
states in contemporary times have been formally associated with a lex fori approach, at least
for tort cases . . . .”).
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For all the criticisms of the First Restatement, there are many instances
in which modern choice of law has not deviated much from the law selected
by the First Restatement.192 The Second Restatement is replete with specific
default rules that tend to point back to the law the First Restatement would
select.193 But perhaps the best example of modern choice of law’s tendency
to gravitate back to the First Restatement is New York choice of law.
New York, and in particular Judge Fuld, was a leader in rejecting the
“discredited”194 territorial approach of the First Restatement. Judge Fuld
concluded that choice of law must include analysis of the interests that
states have in having their law apply to a choice-of-law dispute. 195 Judge
Fuld initiated the choice-of-law revolution.
Then, as a judge on the New York Court of Appeals in Nuemeier v.
Kuehner,196 Judge Fuld attempted to synthesize the previous results that
New York courts had reached in guest-statute cases, and to provide a
blueprint for how those cases should be decided going forward. 197 What
Judge Fuld came up with was this: apply the law of the state where the
accident occurred, unless it is a joint-domicile case.198 When you consider
Judge Fuld’s earlier observation from Babcock that Ontario law would
apply if the purpose of Ontario’s law was conduct-regulating, 199 then Judge
Fuld’s restatement of New York law in Nuemeier was even less of a
deviation from the “old” law: apply the law of the state where the accident
occurred, unless (1) it is a joint-domicile case and (2) the place where the
accident occurred does not have a conduct-regulating law.
Under Judge Fuld’s restatement in Nuemeier, there had been no
horizontal choice-of-law revolution. In terms of the results in actual gueststatute cases, hardly anything had changed. The current fervor in choice of
law seems consistent with the New York experience. Perhaps choice of law
was never in need of a revolution, but instead a rather minor adjustment. In
192. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, California’s Territorial Turn in Choice of Law, 67
RUTGERS UNIV. L. REV. 167, 170–71 (2015) (arguing that California decisions evince a
preference for a territorial resolution to choice-of-law disputes); Michael E. Solimine, An
Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 55 (1989)
(discussing the persistence of the traditional territorial approach to choice of law).
193. See Hoffheimer, supra note 192, at 220–21.
194. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. 1963).
195. Id. at 283–84.
196. 286 N.E.2d 454, 455 (N.Y. 1972).
197. See id. at 457–58 (articulating the “Neumeier rules”).
198. See id. Judge Fuld’s expression of this rule was much more verbose, but the core
idea is the one expressed in the text.
199. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284–85.
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this spirit, I prefer a tiebreaker that defaults to the law selected by the First
Restatement.
V. Conclusion
Since the introduction of state-interest analysis, horizontal choice of law
has been an exceedingly difficult body of law for judges and lawyers. But
this complexity is unnecessary. A state-interest analysis can be reduced to
the type of simple rules that dominated choice of law before state interest
became popular. The Rubric proposed herein achieves this simplicity. The
Rubric also produces results that are largely consistent with the results that
(1) courts have tended to reach and (2) are achieved under the proposed
Third Restatement. With the exception perhaps of law professors, adoption
of the Rubric would represent a win for all affected parties.
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Appendix A
Domicile
1.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

Injury/Bad Conduct

P (NE) v. D (NE)

LA/CR?

Rubric

Third Restatement

Third Restatement
With Injury Instead of
Bad Conduct

NE/NE

LA

No Choice of Law Dispute

NE/NE

CR

No Choice of Law Dispute

NE/KS

LA

False: NE

NE (6.06)

NE

NE/KS

CR

False: NE

KS (6.08)

NE

KS/NE

LA

True: KS

NE(6.06)

NE

KS/NE

CR

True: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

KS/KS

LA

True: KS

NE (6.06)

NE

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
2.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
3.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
4.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
5.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
6.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
7.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
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8.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

KS/KS

CR

True: KS

KS (6.04)

KS

P (NE) v. D (KS)

NE/NE

LA

Unprovided: NE

NE (6.07)

NE

P (NE) v. D (KS)

NE/NE

CR

Unprovided: NE

NE (6.04)

NE

P (NE) v. D (KS)

NE/KS

LA

Unprovided: NE

KS (6.08)

NE

P (NE) v. D (KS)

NE/KS

CR

Unprovided: NE

KS (6.08)

NE

P (NE) v. D (KS)

KS/NE

LA

False: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

P (NE) v. D (KS)

KS/NE

CR

False: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

P (NE) v. D (KS)

KS/KS

LA

False: KS

KS (6.07)

KS

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
9.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

10.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

11.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

12.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

13.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:

14.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:

15.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred
Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:
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16.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

KS/KS

CR

False: KS

KS (6.04)

KS

P (KS) v. D (NE)

NE/NE

LA

True: NE

NE (6.07)

NE

NE/NE

CR

True: NE

NE (6.04)

NE

NE/KS

LA

True: NE

KS (6.08)

NE

NE/KS

CR

True: NE

KS (6.08)

NE

KS/NE

LA

True: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

KS/NE

CR

True: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

KS/KS

LA

True: KS

KS (6.07)

KS

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:
17.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
18.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
19.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
20.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Defendant
21.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
22.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
23.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
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24.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

KS/KS

CR

True: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

NE/NE

LA

False: KS

KS (6.06)

KS

NE/NE

CR

False: KS

NE (6.04)

NE

NE/KS

LA

False: KS

KS (6.06)

KS

NE/KS

CR

False: KS

KS (6.08)

NE

KS/NE

LA

False: KS

KS (6.06)

KS

KS/NE

CR

False: KS

KS (6.08)

KS

KS/KS

LA

No Choice of Law Dispute

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Defendant
25.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
26.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
27.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
28.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
29.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest:
30.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest:
31.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest:

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/4

32.

Kansas—Plaintiff Preferred
Nebraska—Defendant Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

KS/KS

CR

No Choice of Law Dispute

NE/NE

LA

No Choice of Law Dispute

NE/NE

CR

No Choice of Law Dispute

NE/KS

LA

False: NE

NE (6.06)

NE

NE/KS

CR

False: NE

NE (6.08)

NE

KS/NE

LA

False: NE

NE (6.06)

NE

KS/NE

CR

False: NE

NE (6.08)

KS

KS/KS

LA

False: NE

NE (6.06)

NE

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Plaintiff
Nebraska State Interest:
33.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
34.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
35.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
36.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
37.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
38.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
39.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
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40.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (NE)

KS/KS

CR

False: NE

KS (6.04)

KS

NE/NE

LA

True: NE

NE (6.07)

NE

NE/NE

CR

True: NE

NE (6.04)

NE

NE/KS

LA

True: NE

NE (6.08)

NE

NE/KS

CR

True: NE

NE (6.08)

NE

KS/NE

LA

True: KS

NE (6.08)

KS

KS/NE

CR

True: KS

NE (6.08)

KS

KS/KS

LA

True: KS

KS (6.07)

KS

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
41.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
42.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
43.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
44.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
45.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
46.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
47.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/4

48.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (NE) v. D (KS)

KS/KS

CR

True: KS

KS (6.04)

KS

P (KS) v. D (NE)

NE/NE

LA

False: NE

NE (6.07)

NE

P (KS) v. D (NE)

NE/NE

CR

False: NE

NE (6.04)

NE

P (KS) v. D (NE)

NE/KS

LA

False: NE

NE (6.08)

NE

P (KS) v. D (NE)

NE/KS

CR

False: NE

NE (6.08)

NE

P (KS) v. D (NE)

KS/NE

LA

Unprovided: KS

NE (6.08)

KS

P (KS) v. D (NE)

KS/NE

CR

Unprovided: KS

NE (6.08)

KS

P (KS) v. D (NE)

KS/KS

LA

Unprovided: KS

KS (6.07)

KS

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Protect Nebraska Plaintiff
49.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

50.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

51.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

52.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest:
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury

53.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:

54.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:

55.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred
Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:
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56.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (NE)

KS/KS

CR

Unprovided: KS

KS (6.04)

KS

P (KS) v. D (KS)

NE/NE

LA

True: NE

KS (6.06)

KS

NE/NE

CR

True: NE

NE (6.04)

NE

NE/KS

LA

True: NE

KS (6.06)

KS

NE/KS

CR

True: NE

NE (6.08)

NE

KS/NE

LA

False: KS

KS (6.06)

KS

KS/NE

CR

False: KS

NE (6.08)

KS

KS/KS

LA

No Choice of Law Dispute

KS/KS

CR

No Choice of Law Dispute

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury
Nebraska State Interest:
57.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
58.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
59.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
60.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest: Place of Injury
61.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest:
62.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest:
63.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest:
64.

Kansas—Defendant Preferred
Nebraska—Plaintiff Preferred

P (KS) v. D (KS)

Kansas State Interest: Place of Injury Protect Kansas Defendant
Nebraska State Interest:
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